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Understanding Resourcing Trade-offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment

Mirko Heinzel
Maastricht University
Mirko.heinzel@maastrichtuniversity.nl

Bernhard Reinsberg
University of Glasgow
Bernhard.Reinsberg@glasgow.ac.uk

Christian Siauwijaya
University of Glasgow
Christian.Siauwijaya@glasgow.ac.uk

Abstract: International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the most important global challenges under intense budget scarcity. In recent years, they expanded their funding base through a greater reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions by member states and non-state actors. Critics warn that earmarked funding creates an important trade-off: IOs can do more with earmarked funding, but have less control over what they do and do it less well. In this registered report, we probe how staff evaluate different types of earmarking through a novel elite survey experiment with staff from six UN organizations. We show that staff prefer earmarking for their own area of work over other types of earmarking. However, these preferences do not affect the funding amount they deem as appropriate or the overheads they expect their organization to charge. Our study provides important insights for debates on the resourcing of IOs and the motivations of international bureaucrats.

Short title: Understanding Resourcing Trade-offs in International Organizations

Keywords: International Organizations; Bureaucracy; Funding; Survey Experiment; United Nations

The pre-registered (Stage-1) materials for this article can be accessed at: https://osf.io/bez59

Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). The empirical analysis has been successfully replicated by the JOP replication analyst. Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition.

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International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the biggest challenges humanity is facing in the 21st century—fighting global pandemics, addressing the climate emergency, and overcoming global poverty. They perform these functions under intense budgetary pressure (Patz and Goetz 2019). For example, the World Health Organization's total global annual budget is only around 50% of the health budget of Greece, and the UN Development Program's entire budget for development assistance adds up to approximately 13% of the money that the United States Agency for International Development has at its disposal.

In an effort to expand their resource base, IOs have increasingly aimed to attract more earmarked voluntary funding. Earmarked funding refers to resourcing arrangements where IOs promise to allocate funding to specific regions, countries, sectors or even projects, as specified by the donor. These financing arrangements are attractive for donors as they allow them to attribute their funding to specific results and retain control over its allocation (Bayram and Graham 2022). While core funding has stagnated in the last thirty years, earmarked voluntary funding has risen sharply. In the UN system, earmarked contributions from OECD/DAC donors stood at US$ 23.0 billion in 2019. In the same year, core contributions from these donors were US$ 7.5 billion. In other words, three-quarters of the UN's budget come from donor-earmarked funds. The UN system is not unique in its exposure to earmarking, although it is an extreme case: the World Bank received annual contributions over US$ 3.5 billion for donor-earmarked activities. With its US$ 8.4 billion received in unearmarked grant funding for the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's budget share in earmarked funds was about 29.2% in 2019 (Reinsberg, Heinzel, and Siauwijaya 2024). Across the entire multilateral development system, DAC donors earmarked about 50% of their IO funding (Graham 2017; Heinzel, Cormier, and Reinsberg 2023). In other words, the 21st century expansion in IOs' resources has come from a rise in earmarked funding.

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In this registered report[1], we study how IO decision-makers resolve a potential trade-off between upholding established processes and delivering more results brought about by this rise in earmarked funding. We posit that earmarked funding can impact two key dimensions of organizational performance: *results* and *process*. Results refer to the achievement of organizational goals. Process encapsulates how IOs achieve these goals (Gutner and Thompson 2010). Earmarked funding allows IOs to mobilize more funding towards achieving their results. At the same time, it is said to politicize IO funding, shift bargaining power towards donor countries, and increase the transaction costs for IOs (Baumann and Weinlich 2020; Heinzel, Cormier, and Reinsberg 2023). Accepting earmarked funding means that IOs can achieve more results in line with their mandate but potentially implement their programs less well (Schmid, Reitzenstein, and Hall 2021).

IOs can compensate for process losses by charging higher overheads and multiply the results they can deliver by asking for larger budgets. We argue that IO staff expect larger overheads and more funding the more donors ask them to compromise on their established processes through stringent earmarks. However, we do not assume that all staff resolve the trade-off between process and results in the same way. We expect differences based on the primary motivations of staff. Process-driven bureaucrats (Weberian perspective) are more concerned about losses of process performance and therefore would want particularly high compensation in the form of overheads. Conversely, IO staff with a results orientation (mission-driven perspective) are mainly interested in outputs and would therefore want compensation in the form of larger program contributions. Finally, IO staff that aim to

[1] The registered report can be accessed using the link:

https://osf.io/bez59/?view_only=497aa62b3b5f49e2b82bdbbcf7e09032

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maximize their budget and amenities (public choice perspective) would ask for more compensation for funds not allocated to their bureaucratic unit while being more willing to accept funds when they fall within their own remits. We test our hypotheses through an elite survey experiment conducted with 280 staff members from six organizations of the United Nations: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) , International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Our results do not provide clear and consistent support for these theoretical perspectives. We do not find that staff ask for more resources or higher overheads when contributions are earmarked for particular sectors, countries, or projects. However, some of our results align with the public choice view in that staff generally prefer contributions that are earmarked to their own area of work.

Our findings have implications for three broader debates. First, earmarked funding affects the operations, performance, and legitimacy of development IOs, and thus alters the nature of multilateralism (Graham 2023; Patz and Goetz 2019). While researchers have examined the motivations for earmarked funding on the donor side (Bayram and Graham 2017; Eichenauer and Hug 2018), our analysis shifts attention to the crucial role of IO bureaucrats as driving agents of IO funding decisions (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Patz and Goetz 2019; Weaver 2008). Our study shows that IO bureaucrats rarely refuse donor proposals for earmarked funding, despite its downsides. While IO staff can in theory reject donor proposals or ask for higher compensation for strictly earmarked funds, they do not appear to do so frequently in practice—likely because of systemic competition among IOs for donor funding. Our results still suggest that IO bureaucrats can exercise their autonomy ‘on the margins’, by choosing funds that are earmarked to their area of work if they have that choice.

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Second, our study contributes to a long-standing debate about the relationship between the autonomy and the performance of IOs, which has broader implications for the functioning of global governance. Recent research has highlighted that constraints on the autonomy of international bureaucrats can undermine the performance of IOs in addressing global problems (Heinzel, Cormier, and Reinsberg 2023; Honig 2019; Lall 2017; Schmid, Reitzenstein, and Hall 2021). Public administration literature has produced similar findings for state bureaucracies (Tummers and Bekkers 2014; Verhoest, Verschuere, and Bouckaert 2007). However, empirical analyses of IO performance rarely focus on how agents view potential constraints in their autonomy compared to constraints on their ability to deliver on organizational mandates. We find that constraints on autonomy appear to play a relatively minor role for IO staff considerations about project proposals. While they are willing to reject around 11.8% of contributions, these rejections are not strongly linked to earmarked funding. Instead, staff appears to be more concerned about factors like project duration and the source of funding that can, but do not have to be, linked to earmarked funding.

Third, our study focuses on an important trade-off between following the established processes of bureaucratic decision-making and trying to fulfill the mandate of public agencies. This trade-off has been highlighted in many different areas of research on public agencies (Cortell and Peterson 2022; Huber and Shipan 2002). Our case allows us to probe how public sector workers resolve this trade-off in an area of intense resource constraints and to test the theoretical predictions of key theories of public sector motivations—Weberian, public choice, mission-driven—across a large number of public sector workers from countries globally. Despite the particular context of IOs, our results could therefore speak to broader debates on the motivations of public sector workers and how organizations respond under increasing resource pressure (Cooley and Ron 2002; Gordenker and Weiss 1997).

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The performance of international organizations

Existing studies have employed different conceptualizations of IO performance. A common definition of performance is that it "refers to an organization's ability to achieve agreed-upon objectives" (Gutner and Thompson 2010, 231). When operationalizing this concept, scholars have focused on a range of dimensions including output performance, outcome performance, impact performance, process performance, goal attainment, cost-effectiveness, responsiveness, problem-solving effectiveness, compliance and output legitimacy (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Lall 2017; Tallberg et al. 2016).

Following Gutner and Thompson (2010),[2] we summarize these perspectives using two key concepts: *process* and *results*. The results dimension incorporates IOs' ability to solve societal problems they are tasked with. The concept follows the organizational tradition of performance research in broader debates on public agencies (Etzioni 1964; Price 1972). A focus on results includes several related concepts discussed in the literature, including achievement of stated objectives (Lall 2017), problem-solving effectiveness (Panke, Polat, and Hohlstein 2022), compliance (Coen et al. 2022), and goal attainment (Coen et al. 2022). Results encapsulate both the outcomes IOs are trying to achieve and the impact they have on the problems that they are meant to address (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Tallberg et al. 2016).

The process dimension refers to the capacity of IOs to efficiently follow agreed-upon processes. The dimension encompasses several concepts discussed by scholars of IO performance. These include effort, efficiency, skill (Gutner and Thompson 2010), cost-

[2] Gutner and Thompson (2010) discuss these two dimensions as outcome and process performance. Their concept of outcome performance refers to both what others have called outcome performance and impact performance. To avoid the conceptual confusion, we use the term results, which encapsulates both outcome performance and impact performance.

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effectiveness, responsiveness (Lall 2017), and constitutive effectiveness (Coen et al. 2022). In other words, focusing on results entails studying what IOs achieve and process how they achieve it.

While results and process can be mutually reinforcing (Gutner and Thompson 2010), safeguarding processes can also undermine results and vice versa. Public administration research has long demonstrated that improvements in process do not necessarily translate into improvements in results (Kirlin 2001). In IO research, scholars highlighting bureaucratic pathologies have made similar observations (Barnett 2002). One of the key advantages of bureaucracies is their impartial decision-making and rational-legal authority. However, these same procedures can lead to pathological behavior. Chief among bureaucratic pathologies is the tendency of public agencies to prioritize their processes, routines, and rules over larger societal goals (Barnett 2002; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Hence, following established processes can undermine the delivery of results in the day-to-day work of international bureaucrats. At times, they must choose between prioritizing the processes of the bureaucracies they are embedded in, or the broader societal goals they are meant to address. In the next section, we discuss in more detail how the dilemma of lacking resources forces IO bureaucrats to decide between prioritizing process or results.

The earmarked funding trade-off

Core funding, the traditional funding modality of IOs, allows IOs to decide which types of activities they want to undertake to achieve their mandate. Donor principals expect their IO agents to deliver results but without specifying how they achieve them. Donors can exercise their control over core funding only collectively, for example by approving a biennial work program in the UN governing bodies. This approach affords IOs considerable flexibility in the day-to-day allocation of resources. IO management and staff can choose their own priorities

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and be receptive to recipients' preferences. Staff only have to report on core-funded operations through internal reporting systems, which then feed into the collective reporting of the organization, for instance in the form of an annual report (Patz and Goetz 2019). However, the drawback of core funding is its rigidity as core budget allocations are the result of lengthy negotiations among donor countries. These negotiations are often gridlocked and donors are weary of the lack of attribution of their individual contributions to concrete results on the ground. As a result, many operational activities remain underfunded through the core budget compared to ever increasing needs (Patz and Goetz 2019). This lack of funding threatens IOs ability to deliver the results that they are tasked with in their mandates.

To fill critical funding gaps left by insufficient core budget appropriations, IO staff have increasingly turned to earmarked funding. Earmarked funds allow staff to access additional resources by persuading donors to allocate more money for their specific priorities. For example, in the World Bank, the Carbon Finance group has positioned itself as a champion on climate change, tapping into the growing willingness of some donors to increase their climate finance commitments and repositioning the World Bank as a climate bank (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011; Reinsberg 2017). Earmarked funding can also extend the resource envelope by drawing in non-traditional donors, like private foundations. In contrast to core funding, earmarked funding vehicles are attractive to private donors because they can be formally represented in the governing boards of these initiatives (Graham 2017; McDowell et al. 2024).

However, to ensure that earmarked funding is actually used for pre-specified purposes, donors draw up additional rules that agents have to follow during implementation (Hawkins et al. 2006). They pre-determine how their money can be used and put stringent monitoring and reporting requirements on IOs in exchange for these funds (Schmid, Reitzenstein, and Hall 2021). These procedures undermine IOs' ability to deliver on two key process dimensions

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highlighted in the literature: cost-effectiveness and responsiveness to recipient need (Lall 2017).

First, earmarked funding increases transaction costs for IO staff. Earmarked funding is often used by donors to impose additional control mechanisms on IO staff. These additional control mechanisms include the need to relate to donors, to raise funds even for small-scale activities, and additional reporting tailored to donor needs (Graham 2015; Reinsberg 2017; Schmid, Reitzenstein, and Hall 2021). They increase the transaction costs for IO staff and a relatively greater percentage of available budgets has to be used to cover the 'cost of doing business' rather than benefiting recipients. While donors in principle must pay an administrative fee on earmarked contributions, this fee may potentially be deducted from the total contribution (Baumann and Weinlich 2020). Indeed, research has shown that supervision costs increase substantially when IO staff work on earmarked projects—even holding project budgets constant (Heinzel, Cormier, and Reinsberg 2023).

Second, staff may also be less able to respond to recipient needs for earmarked funds. The autonomy of IO staff decreases for earmarked funds compared to core funding since donors have a greater say in dictating the way their money can be spent (Bayram and Graham 2022; Graham 2015). Of course, scholars of IO autonomy have long demonstrated that private information attained through work on the ground, specialized expertise, and links to other actors can create informal autonomy and increase the discretion of IO staff (Clark and Zucher 2024; Heinzel 2022; Honig 2019; Lall 2017; Lang, Kentikelenis and Wellner 2024; Martin 2006). However, these factors are present for both core and earmarked funds. While we do not claim that staff have no autonomy when managing earmarked funds, we expect that, all else equal, staff will be less able to cater operations to the preferences of recipients.

Taken together, we posit that earmarked funding involves a tradeoff for IO staff between process and results. On the one hand, earmarked funding allows staff to expand their

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operational activities and thereby contribute to the achievement of their mandate. The expansion of IO activities increases their ability to work towards achieving results as they are able to do more to address their broad mandates. On the other hand, earmarked funding tends to undermine process performance because donors use their direct line of accountability for specific requests related to how IO staff manage, implement, and evaluate aid projects. Hence, where IO staff accept earmarked funding, they grow their budget but at the expense of operational efficiency.

IOs can demand compensation from donors to ensure that the process-related costs are not threatening the benefits of increasing their funding through overheads and larger financial contributions. IOs charge overheads for earmarked funding to compensate for efficiency losses. Standard overhead rates range from 7% to 15% in the UN system depending on the entity (Baumann, Lundsgaarde, and Weinlich 2020). Overheads allow IOs to compensate the cost of administering earmarked funds. Moreover, larger contributions shift the balance from process to results. While the rise in transaction costs might not be worth it for a small contribution, the calculus changes substantially the more money a donor promises to contribute. In other words, the more money a donor promises, the more inclined IO staff will be to see the benefits from this large contribution and the positive difference that they could make with these funds. Therefore, our first hypothesis reads:

Hypothesis 1: Staff will demand larger funding amounts and management overheads for earmarked contributions.

Staff motivations and variation in earmarking stringency

Earmarking contracts vary in their restrictiveness. These differences may shape the process–results trade-off (Baumann, Lundsgaarde, and Weinlich 2020). While some earmarking modalities leave IO staff more autonomy in managing their operations, others impose stricter control mechanisms. We theorize variation in sensitivity to the costs of earmarking as a

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function of this stringency of earmarking and the motivations of IO staff. IO staff are not a homogenous group that responds to the costs and benefits of different funding modalities in the same way. Depending on the assumptions made about the drivers of staff motivations, we would expect that staff reconcile the earmarking trade-off differently. We develop three ideal-typical perspectives on staff motivations: Weberian, mission-driven, and public choice perspectives.

The first perspective highlights that staff are primarily affected by the bureaucratic culture of their organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Weaver 2008). These authors are informed by Weberian conceptions of bureaucracy (Weber 1978). They argue that when joining IOs, staff are socialized into a strong bureaucratic culture. Staff motivations can be best explained by understanding the prevailing norms and rules within these organizations and what they imply for the specific situation at hand. Staff care about the rational-legal authority of their organizations, which is upheld by rigorously following bureaucratic processes (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Given the discussed earmarking-induced losses in process performance, we would expect staff to be particularly concerned about the performance losses inherent in stringent forms of earmarked funding.

The most stringent form of earmarking are project-specific earmarks. Project earmarking refers to donor support for a discrete intervention. Especially in the UN context, many projects would not exist if it was not for the discretionary contribution of the donor. This dynamic provides donors with full control over the precise nature of the intervention. Where IO staff cannot choose sectors, recipients, and implementation modalities, donors essentially relegate IO staff to mere implementers (Baumann, Lundsgaarde, and Weinlich 2020). Some donors even ask for being involved in project implementation, for instance through secondments from their own aid bureaucracies. These demands may come on top of increased reporting requirements specified by the donor (Achamkulangare and Tarasov 2017). The small-

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scale nature of earmarked projects, coupled with their short time horizon in which IO staff must demonstrate tangible results, causes additional losses in process performance. Hence, project-type earmarking involves the highest costs for the process performance of IOs.

These losses in process performance would need to be compensated by increasing the capacity of the organization to uphold its established processes. Earmarked funding that promises to be less operationally burdensome will be more attractive to IO staff. Overheads can allow IOs to uphold established processes even in the face of rising transaction costs. Therefore, we would expect staff to ask for increased overheads for project-specific contributions. Hence, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2: Staff will demand larger management overheads for project-specific earmarked contributions compared to sector and country-specific earmarks.

The second perspective on public sector organizations posits that staff are primarily mission-driven—they are more concerned about achieving desired societal results than upholding longstanding processes (Goodsell 2010; Honig 2024). Scholars highlighting these motivational drivers argue that public sector workers tend to possess a: "general, altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation or humankind" (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999, 20). IOs' mandates focus on central problems for humanity, including protecting global health, fighting climate change, overcoming poverty and safeguarding food security. Given these important mandates and the lack of financing to address them, we would expect results-driven staff to be more inclined to compromise on organizational processes if it allows the organization to implement additional projects and programs. Hence, they would be more welcoming towards earmarked funding and care primarily about the amount of money an organization would receive.

While mission-driven staff would value the increasing ability to generate outputs towards achieving organizational mandates, they would still be concerned about their ability

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to use the money for societal good. More stringent earmarks also have concerning externalities for results-driven staff. Project-specific earmarks do not leave implementing staff with the discretion to identify program countries or sectors. This inability can undermine results as staff are less able to target funds to areas where they are most needed or can make the greatest difference (Honig 2019). Staff are less able to consider operational factors such as their IOs' capacity, ownership from the government, and potential for learning for other contexts when making decisions on how to allocate their budget. Therefore, we expect staff focused primarily on results to demand larger amounts of funding to compensate for particularly stringent earmarks. We posit:

> *Hypothesis 3: Staff will demand larger funding amounts for project-specific earmarked contributions compared to sector and country-specific earmarks.*

The third perspective on staff motivations highlights the importance of bureaucratic politics (Peters 2010). How staff reconcile the trade-off in earmarked funding may depend on where they sit in the organizational hierarchy. The public choice tradition has argued that national and international bureaucrats care about maximizing their unit-specific budgets to increase their amenities (Dunleavy 1991; Niskanen 1971; Vaubel 2006). Different types of earmarked funding vary in the extent to which they privilege specific groups of staff in the organizational hierarchy. For example, some staff members work mainly on specific countries. These staff are deployed in country offices (or regional offices with responsibility for several countries) and their tasks include project management and liaising with policymakers in recipient countries. Country-level earmarks are one of the most common forms of earmarked funding. A prominent example of country-earmarked funds is the Law-and-Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) at the UN Development Program. From the perspective of UNDP staff working on Afghanistan, these earmarks may be less problematic. On the contrary, earmarked funding to a given staff member's office may even be perceived as beneficial

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because it supports their work program and allows them to fill funding gaps. At the same time, staff may be more wary of earmarks for other offices that disadvantage them in the intraorganizational competition for funds. When donors earmark large contributions to other offices, the inner-organizational influence and prestige of their office may decline. Therefore, the bureaucratic politics perspective would assume that staff are not particularly concerned about earmarks to their own office but more skeptical of earmarked funding to other offices. These dynamics would apply whenever earmarks create funding for IOs that particular staff members have no chance of accessing because it is specified to another sector or country than their main area of work. The corresponding hypothesis is:

> *Hypothesis 4: Demand for additional funding amounts and overheads will be smaller for earmarked contributions to the staff member's main area of work.*

Research design


We conducted an elite survey experiment with staff members from six IOs to understand how they reconcile the trade-off between results and process performance. We selected these IOs to maximize the diversity of our sample in terms of both resourcing and effectiveness. We restricted our sample to the universe of UN-affiliated organizations to ensure comparability. To obtain a better understanding of our distribution of cases, we examined the relationship between the prevalence of earmarking and the performance of IOs in the population of UN organizations. We drew upon data from the Multilateral Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN 2024).[3] Supported by OECD/DAC donors, this independent network has produced 64 evaluations of 32 IOs from 2009 to 2021 measuring their performance based on document reviews and stakeholder interviews. MOPAN gauges the presence of systems, rules, and procedures that allow IOs to achieve results in an effective, efficient, and responsive manner.

[3] The data are standardized following the approach by Reinsberg and Siauwijaya (2023)

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We selected IOs based on a stratified random sampling technique. We separated the sample of UN-affiliated IOs into four quadrants based on their performance and their earmarking shares (Figure 3). IOs are classified as "high" on each dimension if they exceed the (rounded) median level of performance or earmarking and as low if they are on or below the (rounded) median level. In each quadrant we randomly selected one IO. These were FAO, UNFPA, UNESCO and UNICEF. To ensure a large-enough sample of targeted respondents, we randomly selected two more IOs from the whole universe of cases (IFAD and UNDP).

Figure 1: Universe of IO cases



Notes: Dashed lines represent respectively the median earmarking share (x-axis) and the process performance (y-axis) in the population of UN organizations (rounded).

By choosing a diverse sample of operational IOs that vary substantially in our two key variables of interest, earmarking share and performance, we aim to maximize the generalizability of our findings to other IOs. The IOs we chose vary substantially in their budget—from IFAD with approximately US$ 180 million per year to UNICEF with a budget of more than US$ 7 billion—and differ in their mandates in agriculture, food security, reproductive health, cultural protection, the protection of children and human development. While the UN is most affected by earmarked funding, staff in other IOs face similar tradeoffs (Engel and Mattheis 2019; Staeger 2023). Even Multilateral Development Banks, which have

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access to financial markets to support their development activities, are relying on earmarked funding. For example, almost 30% of the World Bank's grant-funded operations come from donor trust funds (Reinsberg, Heinzel, and Siauwijaya 2024). We acknowledge that the IOs we chose are not fully representative on all dimensions that IO scholars deem important but we are confident that the findings from our sample would generalize to a larger set of operational IOs active across policy areas.

We recruited respondents in two ways. First, we collected 17,324 email addresses of staff members working at these six IOs. We drew on a list of office locations of each of the IOs collected by Eckhard and Parizek (2020) and then searched publicly available social media profiles to identify the names of individuals that claim affiliation with each of the six IOs in each office location. We coded 20% of those individuals for each country office to ensure that our sample is balanced across office locations. We used the self-descriptions of these staff members to code them into five broad categories (administrative and legal support staff, technical consultants, technical staff, finance staff, and other). To limit the sample to those staff members that potentially have exposure to IO fundraising or implementation, we only included technical consultants, technical staff and finance staff in our list of potential respondents. Finally, we emailed these individuals to invite them to participate in a survey. Each individual received two reminders. Approximately 11,334 emails reached their intended targets.[4] Since all email addresses have organizational domain names, we can be sure that all contacted people are actually staff at the six IOs. We were able to recruit 181 respondents through these means (response rate approximately 1.5%). We expected a 50-60% email bounce rate and a 5%

[4] The rest of the emails bounced as these addresses did not exist (anymore). One of the six organizations had a catch-all email server, which means that we could not assess how many emails bounced. The range of emails that were delivered is between 10,330 and 12,338.

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response rate based on comparable surveys with a similar recruitment technique (Briggs 2021). Our email underperformed this expectation. However, the low response rate is in line with other studies using cold-email recruitment of IO staff, which often to range between 1 and 5% (Heinzel, Weaver, and Briggs 2024).

Second, given the relatively low response rate in the first round, we used an additional recruitment technique to increase statistical power. To this end, we drew on a recent method popularized by Clark (2022). We utilized the paid direct message advertisement service of the social media company LinkedIn. LinkedIn allows for targeting based on employers. Hence, we targeted our messages to LinkedIn users that claimed affiliation with the six IOs and sent them a message to invite them to participate in our survey. This approach was not in our original registered report but we pre-registered the stopping rule (based on a pre-specified budget) after the initial data collection. We recruited an additional 99 respondents through this method. Hence, our final sample included 280 UN staff members.[5]

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment with these IO staff members (Arias and Blair 2022; Briggs 2021; Heinzel, Weaver, and Jorgensen 2024). We used a conjoint experiment for conceptual and methodological reasons (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). First, earmarking comes in different varieties and differs on multiple dimensions. We leveraged these dimensions to understand whether staff are primarily concerned about process, output performance or budget maximization within their own offices. Conjoint experiments are uniquely tailored to testing hypotheses on multidimensional evaluations. Second, a conjoint survey experiment allowed us to increase statistical power. As discussed, we anticipated a rather low response rate. Conjoint experiments maximize statistical

[5] The sample included 98 UNDP, 53 UNICEF, 37 FAO, 19 UNFPA, 8 UNESCO, and 2 IFAD staff. 63 staff members preferred not to disclose their employer.

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power through independent randomization of levels and multiple evaluations of the same profile by the same respondents.

Respondents read the following text: "Many international organizations rely on voluntary contributions that vary on multiple dimensions. Below we display two hypothetical contributions." Afterwards, respondents saw two profiles of member state contributions that vary with two levels within six financing features (Table 1). The six features were: earmarked to your area of work, earmarked to specific country, earmarked to specific sector, earmarked to specific project, length, and donor type. While the latter two profile features do not relate to our hypotheses, we included them to increase the realism of the experiment. Each feature had two levels that were independently randomized (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015). After reading the profiles, respondents were asked to answer open response questions.

The first question was: "The typical contribution to a UN organization is approximately 1.84 million USD. For each of the two contributions, please indicate in million USD how large the minimum grant amount would need be to be worth it for the international organization (please write "No" if you do not think that the international organization should accept the contribution)". To increase the external validity of our experiment, we used an open response dependent variable. We constrained answer categories to four characters and included a statement on the average contribution for IOs (Reinsberg, Heinzel, and Siauwijaya 2024)[6] to anchor respondents on the actual funding amounts and provide them with knowledge about these amounts. This approach is closest to internal discussions on accepting funding as staff will not take these decisions without any background information on whether a contribution is substantial.

[6] IFAD: 1.94 million, UNDP 1.96 million, UNFPA 1.62 million, UNICEF 2.18 million, FAO 1.25 million, UNESCO 0.86 million

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The second open-response question was: "The typical overheads charged by a UN organization is around 11% (Baumann and Weinlich 2020). For each of the two contributions, please indicate how much overheads an international organization should charge in percent (please write "No" if you do not think that the international organization should accept the contribution)". The answer allowed a maximum of three characters.

We refrained from employing a forced choice option in our main models for methodological and substantive reasons. First, research on the external validity of conjoint experiments shows that forced choice options perform worse than rating tasks in their external validity (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015). Second, employing a forced choice option implies that IOs are forced to accept all contributions. While we believe that they mostly do, giving respondents the opportunity to reject contributions increases the realism of our experiment. Nevertheless, we probe robustness to the more traditional type of conjoint experiment. We asked each respondent to rate seven pairs of profiles. Therefore, we have fourteen observations for each respondent. Following our consent form, we excluded responses where respondents did not rate all seven profiles. Since our questions focus on an area that UN staff engage with frequently, we refrained from conducting knowledge or manipulation checks.

Table 1: Features and levels in conjoint experiment

Feature	Contribution 1	Contribution 2
Earmarked to your area of work	Yes/No	Yes/No
Earmarked to specific country	Yes/No	Yes/No
Earmarked to specific sector	Yes/No	Yes/No
Earmarked to specific project	Yes/No	Yes/No
Length	Spend within one year/three years	Spend within one year/three years
Donor	Private Foundation/ member state	Private Foundation/ member state

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Our analysis relies on sufficient statistical power. We conduct a statistical power calculation using a method recently developed for conjoint experiments (Schuessler and Freitag 2020).[7] In our registered report, we expected to recruit a sample of 6062 observations. However, we only attained 3873 responses. Our original power analysis indicated that we would be able to identify effect sizes of between 0.33 and 0.55 in the overhead models—depending on the power level. Our updated power analysis shows that we have sufficient statistical power to identify effect sizes of between 0.44 and 0.55—depending on the power level. These effects are approximately 4-5% of our overhead reference. Hence, we believe that we are able to reliably identify null effects.

We analyze our survey data by displaying marginal means to increase consistency and ease interpretation. Leeper et al. (2020) argue that the average marginal component effects commonly used to analyze data from conjoint experiments are problematic when analyzing sub-group differences as they are sensitive to the levels of support in the reference category. While we do not conduct sub-group analyses in the main body of the article, we conduct exploratory tests for differences among sub-groups in the Appendix (Heinzel, Reinsberg, and Siauwijiaya 2025).

To increase the realism of our experiment, we allowed respondents to indicate that their IOs should reject contributions by writing "No" in the open response option. We anticipated that very few or none of the respondents would do so. However, 11.8% of respondents chose this option. We pre-registered that we would estimate seemingly unrelated regressions–specifically conditional mixed-process models—if more than 5% of contributions would be rejected (Roodman 2011). Hence, we analyze the impact of project features on both the

[7] More details can be found in the Appendix (Heinzel, Reinsberg, and Siauwijiaya 2025).

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likelihood that contributions are rejected and their impact on the continuous part of our dependent variables. We estimate the first equation using probit regression and the second with OLS.[8] We also employ IO fixed effects to control for differences between IOs (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).

Results

Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we test our hypotheses by displaying the marginal means for each level with 95% confidence intervals. Figure 3 shows the results for both main dependent variables—overheads and contributions.[9] Figure 4 displays the impact of each of the conjoint features on the likelihood that respondents would reject contributions.

We fail to reject the null hypothesis that earmarking features are unrelated to the amount of funding and overheads UN staff deem as necessary for a given contribution. All of our pre-specified tests yield null results. Regarding Hypothesis 1, the "Yes" coefficient for the three earmarking features is not larger than the "No" coefficient ($p<0.05$) for any of the two dependent variables. The project-earmarking coefficient is not significantly different from the sector and country-earmarking coefficient for the overhead (Hypothesis 2) or the funding amount dependent variables (Hypothesis 3). Finally, the main-area-of-work coefficient is not significantly different from the other earmarking coefficients (Hypothesis 4).

That said, when focusing on whether staff reject funds in Figure 4, our results show that UN staff are less likely to reject funds that are earmarked for their main area of work. Moreover,


[8] We pre-registered that we would estimate a seemingly unrelated regression if more than 5% of the contributions were being rejected.

[9] We pre-register our priors on the size of each of the four earmarking marginal means in the Appendix.

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we display results from a conjoint experiment that asked staff to choose between the different project features. We pre-registered this specification to probe whether the design of our dependent variable affected our results. Figure 5 displays the results from this estimation. It shows that staff are not indifferent to earmarking. Indeed, they are significantly more likely ($p<0.05$) to choose contributions that are earmarked for their own area of work and their sector. The heterogeneity in results between the forced choice experiment and the open-response experiment implies that staff prefer certain earmarking modalities over others but that these preferences are not strong enough to shape their views of the funding amounts or overheads that render a contribution worth pursuing for their organization.


Figure 2: conjoint experiment: amount (left) and overheads (right)



Note: Figure displays marginal means across profile features (earmarked country, earmarked sector, earmarked project, length, donor) for both dependent variables (overheads and funding amounts).


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Figure 3: conjoint experiment: rejection of funds



Note: Figure displays marginal means across profile features (earmarked country, earmarked sector, earmarked project, length, donor) for rejection of funds.

Figure 4: *conjoint experiment: forced choice*



Note: Figure displays marginal means across profile features (earmarked country, earmarked sector, earmarked project, length, donor) for the forced choice conjoint experiment.

In a second step, we probe the mechanisms driving the choices respondents made. To this end, we asked respondents to answer an open response question explaining their view on earmarked

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funding. 182 respondents answered this question and mentioned positive or negative factors related to earmarked funding. We used an inductive approach to code the reasons they gave and present evidence on the five most mentioned merits and demerits of earmarked funding. We display a frequency table of the mentioned argument based on our coding of these statements (Table 2).

Respondents mention a range of positives and negatives of earmarked funding. The most prominent argument against earmarking was a lack of flexibility—mentioned by 53.51%. As one respondent working for UNDP argues: "earmarked funding can limit the flexibility of international organizations to allocate resources according to changing priorities or emerging needs. This can hinder their ability to respond effectively to unforeseen challenges" (Respondent 24). 16.21% of respondents are also concerned by administrative burdens. For example, one UNICEF staffer argues, earmarking comes with "high transactional cost for drafting earmarked proposals and budgets and monitoring expenses" (Respondent 109). Another concern mentioned by UN staff are alignments with needs (mentioned by 12.57%). For example, one FAO worker stresses that earmarking "prevents using the funds for some emerging issues requiring urgent response" (Respondent 177). Another concern is that donors are gaining too much influence. As one UNICEF staff member puts it: "Earmarked funding may distort national priorities by directing resources toward donor-preferred sectors or projects that may not align with the recipient country's long-term development strategy" (Respondent 178). Moreover, 9.19% respondents are concerned about a lack of recipient ownership: "Funding priorities are still mostly discussed and negotiated in a very top-down approach, which sometimes does not reflect the priorities and needs of the concerned stakeholders or beneficiaries a project or an action would ultimately impact" (Respondent 36, FAO). Similarly, 9.19% of respondents highlight increased fragmentation as a key concern: "Multiple earmarked

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funds targeting different aspects of a project or program can lead to fragmentation and inefficiencies" (Respondent 145, UNICEF).

However, respondents also recognize benefits that come with earmarking. 22.7% of respondents mention that the targeted nature of earmarking is beneficial. For example, one UNDP staff member argues: "Earmarked funds are specifically designated for particular purposes or projects. This ensures that resources are directed toward critical areas" (Respondent 148). Furthermore, UNDP staff also highlight that earmarking increases accountability (20%): "Earmarked funds often come with clear guidelines and reporting requirements, enhancing transparency and accountability in the use of public funds. This can help prevent misuse or misallocation of resources and improve overall governance" (Respondent 161). A further benefit from earmarking is the ability to raise more funds (18.38%). As one UNFPA staff member puts it: "One of the main advantages of earmarked funding is related to the availability of a reliable and more or less sustainable funding source for the projects and programs" (Respondent 180). Additional positive benefits from earmarking mentioned by staff include donor satisfaction (12.43%)—"Earmarked funding provides clarity and assurance to donors that their contributions will be used for specific purposes, increasing donor confidence and potentially attracting more funding for targeted projects" (Respondent 115, UNESCO) —and clarity—"the earmarked funds allow clarity in the planning process" (Respondent 17, UNICEF)—mentioned by 10.81%.

Table 2: Arguments on earmarked funding

	Argument	Position	Frequency
1	Flexibility	Contra	53.51%
2	Administrative burdens	Contra	16.21%
3	Alignment with needs	Contra	12.97%
4	Donor interests	Contra	12.97%

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5.	Recipient ownership	Contra	9.19%
	Fragmentation	Contra	9.19%

	Argument	**Position**	**Frequency**
1.	Targeted	Pro	22.70%
2.	Accountability	Pro	20.00%
3.	More funding	Pro	18.38%
4.	Donor satisfaction	Pro	12.43%
5.	Clarity	Pro	10.81%

Together, the qualitative evidence provides explanations for our quantitative findings. Somewhat surprisingly, staff hold quite balanced views on earmarking. They widely acknowledge the downsides discussed in the academic literature. However, they also highlight several potential upsides, including clarity and targeting, that are less discussed in debates on earmarked funding. These more balanced views might explain some of the null findings we observe.

We conduct several robustness checks and exploratory analyses to substantiate the conclusions drawn in this article. First, we re-weight responses according to their gender, grade and their region to make the sample more representative. We attain these variables based on additional survey questions. The demographic information of the broader sample of staff for our six IOs, stem from the UN's publicly available personnel statistics (Figure A2). The results are substantively similar.

Second, most conjoint analyses cluster standard errors at the individual level. We did not do so in the main models because recent methodological literature calls into question the necessity of clustering (Schuessler and Freitag 2020). Therefore, we employ a robustness check with clustered standard errors (Figure A3 & A4). The results remain similar in these specifications.

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Third, we conduct exploratory analyses probing differences between country-focused and sectoral staff in their evaluations of conjoint features (Figure A5 & A6). We show that country-focused staff ask for higher funding amounts for country-earmarked contributions and sector-focused staff for sector-focused contributions. These findings reinforce the results from the forced choice conjoint.

Fourth, we estimate models separately for each IO to understand heterogeneity across the four IOs where we have sufficient statistical power (Figure A7 & A8). The results are very similar across IO contexts.

Fifth, as our dependent variables are open-response, they are right skewed. We display the distribution of the dependent variables in the Appendix (Figure A9 & A10). To account for this distribution, we estimate marginal means using a Poisson model as well as a CMP model with logged dependent variables in the Appendix (Figures A11-14). The results do not differ.

Sixth, we re-estimate models separately excluding the responses from the LinkedIn recruitment as we added this recruitment strategy after the initial pre-registration (Figure A15). Again, the results are similar. Finally, we use the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (false discovery rate of 5%) to understand the sensitivity of our results to multiple comparisons (Liu and Shiraito 2023) (Table A5).

Conclusion

Despite the importance of addressing problems like food security, human development, cultural protection, or reproductive health, IOs that are tasked with delivering these mandates remain seriously underfunded. While core funding under the collective control of member states has stagnated, earmarked funding has massively increased over the past two decades, especially in the UN system (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017; Graham 2017). This funding provides individual donors with greater say over how multilateral funds are spent, thereby

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limiting the autonomy of IO staff and increasing the transaction cost of aid delivery (Baumann, Lundsgaarde, and Weinlich 2020; Schmid, Reitzenstein, and Hall 2021). However, if earmarked funding is indeed so problematic, why do IOs continue to accept these funds?

These questions could not be timelier, as the share of core funding in IO budgets will likely continue to decline in the coming years, despite all attempts to the contrary like the UN Funding Compact. The reasons are manifold: many wealthy donors experience economic woes that also affect foreign aid budgets; the persistence of nationalist tendencies in donor countries leads to increasing resistance; donors are under pressure to demonstrate accountability for aid budgets; and the rise of newly emerging donors like China compromises the ability of the established donors to assert their preferences.

Earmarked funding presents a tradeoff for IOs. On the one hand, it allows them to expand their activities and thereby achieve results they could otherwise not deliver. On the other hand, earmarked resources reduce operational efficiency because they require IO staff to navigate complex donor demands during fundraising, implementation, and reporting. Additional controls reduce the efficiency of delegation, limit the autonomy of IOs and may prevent staff from making the right decisions in their specific local development contexts (Heinzel, Cormier, and Reinsberg 2023; Honig 2019). This expectation is not unique to development agencies: research in public administration demonstrates that bureaucrats will often use delegated discretion to provide better services to clients (Eckhouse 2022; Goodsell 2010; Honig 2024; Tummers and Bekkers 2014).

In deciding under which conditions to accept earmarked funding, IO staff must balance the benefits of enlarged budgets with potential losses of process performance. We expected that staff resolve these tradeoffs in different ways depending on the nature of the earmarked contribution as well as their preferences. However, our results do not align with these expectations. While staff appear to have clear preferences for funds earmarked to their own

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area of work, earmarking modalities do not shape how much money they think their organization should ask for a given project or how much overheads they perceive as appropriate.

Our results offer important insights into an underappreciated facet of the principal–agent relationship in IOs: How do staff balance competing objectives of their work under intense resource scarcity? When are they willing to sacrifice some autonomy for the promise of delivering toward their mandate? While IO staff clearly highlight downsides from earmarking—including lacking flexibility, administrative burdens, alignment with needs, bias toward donor interests, lack of recipient ownership, and increased fragmentation—they do not ask for compensation for these downsides through higher overheads or larger funding amounts.

These results were also supported by the qualitative analysis, which implied that staff display high awareness of the trade-off that earmarked funding poses to their organization. Yet, they hold balanced views regarding earmarked funding—staff clearly identify the downsides but also highlight advantages beyond the ability to raise more funds. These advantages include opportunities for a more targeted approach to projects, increased accountability, clarity in implementation demands, and increases in donor satisfaction. These findings could explain the relatively low rejection rate of donor proposals for earmarked projects and the very limited compensation demanded for stringent earmarking. In sum, the insights we provide on the views of staff help illuminate why international bureaucrats keep vying for earmarked funding despite its disadvantages.

Finally, our results contribute to a better understanding of bureaucratic motivations in public agencies (Ege 2020). IOs can be seen as an extreme case (Eckhard 2021) of public agencies with global reach of their operations, substantial diversity of their workforce and their intense funding constraints and fundraising needs compared to the national level. Such an extreme case can provide useful insights to broader debates on the motivations of public

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bureaucrats because it allows to tease out bureaucratic motivations when the stakes are particularly high (Gailmard and Patty 2007). Trade-offs between process and results pervade all public agencies due to the bureaucratic nature of decision-making. Indeed, public-sector reforms in the spirit of the New Public Management sought to push public agencies from a process- focus to a results-focus (Politt and Bouckaert 2011). In line with the public choice view of bureaucratic politics, we find some indications that UN staff are more willing to accept process- and performance-losses when their own offices benefit than when other offices benefit from funding contributions. However, these differences do not shape staff's perception of what contributions their organization should accept overall.

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Biographical Statements: Mirko Heinzel is an Assistant Professor at Maastricht University, Netherlands; Bernhard Reinsberg is a Professor at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom; Christian Siauwijaya was a Research Assistant at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom

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Appendix: Understanding Resourcing Trade-offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment

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1. Design table:

Table A1: Design table

Question	***Hypothesis***	***Sample plan***	***Analysis plan***	***Interpretation given to different outcomes***
How do staff resolve the earmarked funding trade-off between process and results?	*H1: Staff will demand larger funding amounts and management overheads for earmarked contributions.*	We selected a diverse sample of 6 IOs that differ on two key dimensions: their evaluated process performance and the extent to which they are earmarked. We then collected the email addresses of 17,324 staff members of these 6 IOs and will email them a survey participation link. All respondents that fill out the full survey will be included in the sample.	The data are based on a conjoint survey experiment. We will test H1-H4 using two dependent variables: overheads and grant amount. Respondents indicate how much overheads and how much overall contributions they would be willing to accept for two hypothetical grants by donors. These hypothetical grants are made up of randomized combinations of the following six features (earmarked to country (Yes/No), earmarked to sector (Yes/No), earmarked to project (Yes/No), earmarked to main area of work (Yes/No), speed of contribution (1 year/3 years), donor (private/ member state). The levels of each feature are independently randomized and the respondents will rate four pairs of profiles (eight observations per respondent) The conjoint experiment will be analyzed by estimating marginal means, with IO fixed effects, standard errors clustered at the respondent level. The marginal means will be estimated (depending on the distribution of the open response numerical dependent variable) using OLS, PPML, CMP (probit + continuous) or CMP (probit + poisson) models.	We expect a positive and statistically significant ($p<0.05$) difference between the marginal means for earmarking variables „Yes“ compared to „No“. We fail to reject the null hypothesis if the difference in marginal means is not statistically significant for any of the three earmarking dimensions (country, sector and project). If we fail to reject the null hypothesis for country, sector and project earmarks, we will interpret this as evidence that staff is not concerned over the burden of earmarking and are primarily interested in attaining all funding the IO can get.
	H2: Staff will demand larger management overheads for project-specific earmarked contributions			We expect that the difference in the marginal means of overheads for project-specific earmarked contributions (Yes vs No) is larger than that of country (Yes vs No) and sector-specific earmarks (Yes vs No). We will use a Wald test for equivalence assessment. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, we will interpret this as evidence that staff are not substantively driven by concerns over process performance when deciding on the earmarked funding trade-off.
	H3: Staff will demand larger funding amounts for project-specific earmarked contributions			We expect that the difference in the marginal means of grant amounts for project-specific earmarked contributions (Yes vs No) is larger than that of country (Yes vs No) and sector-specific earmarks (Yes vs No). We will use a Wald test for equivalence assessment. If we fail to reject the null for H3, we interpret this as evidence that staff are not substantively driven by concerns over output performance when deciding on the earmarked funding trade-off.
	H 4: Demand for additional funding amounts and overheads will be smaller for earmarked contributions to the staff member's main area of work.			We expect that the difference in the marginal means of grant amounts and overheads for earmarked contributions to the staff members main area of work (Yes vs No) is smaller than that of country (Yes vs No), sector-specific earmarks (Yes vs No), and project-specific earmarks (Yes vs No). We will use a Wald test for equivalence assessment. If we fail to reject the null for H4 we interpret this as evidence that staff are not substantively driven by concerns over the interests of their bureaucratic sub-unit when deciding on the earmarked funding trade-off.

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2. Specifying priors

Table A2: Anticipated effect sizes

Hypotheses	Overheads (marginal means)	MM diff	Amount (marginal means)	MM diff
Project-earmarked	Yes: 11.5 No: 10.7	0.8	Yes: 1.86 No: 1.75	0.11
Country-earmarked	Yes: 11.3 No: 10.8	0.5	Yes: 1.83 No: 1.76	0.07
Sector-earmarked	Yes: 11.3 No: 10.8	0.5	Yes: 1.83 No: 1.76	0.07
Area-of-work-earmarked	Yes: 11.0 No: 10.9	0.1	Yes: 1.81 No: 1.79	0.02

3. Distribution of the sample

Table A3: Distribution of staff in sample


Staff category	**Count**	**Included**
Administrative and legal support staff	3,065	No
Technical consultants	1,966	Yes
Finance	1,776	Yes
Technical staff	13,582	Yes
Other	497	No
Total	20,886	
Included	17,324	

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4. Power analysis

Overheads for UN organizations range from 7 to 15%. We anchor respondents with an 11% overhead reference. Figure 4 plots the sample size needed for detecting a difference in means between two project features with $p < 0.05$. We display a range of effect sizes ranging from 2% (0.22) to 10% of the overhead reference (1.1) for three conventional power-levels (0.7, 0.8 and 0.9). The blue line marks our sample size of 3873 observations. The power calculation shows that we can expect to detect an effect size of between 0.44 and 0.55 depending on the power-level used—or approximately 4-5% of the overhead reference. Therefore, statistical power is sufficient to detect meaningful null effects of our treatments.

Figure A1: Statistical power for conjoint experiment (overheads)



Note: Power calculation based on Schuessler and Freitas (2020). The plot displays the number of observations needed to attain effect sizes between 2% and 10% of the overhead reference. The blue line denotes our number of observations.

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5. Coding table: Non-numerical responses

Table A4: Coding table of non-numerical responses

Responses	Coded as
accept contribution after diligence	0.00
accept after diligence	0.00
any amount is good	0.00
any amount!	0.00
anything after diligence	0.00
Yes	0.00
yes	0.00
yes	0.00
Yes	0.00
No	Reject
Noo	Reject
May not be appealing for fast delivering organizations	Reject
Can't say	Missing
Cannot answer	Missing
Cannot answer	Missing
cannot answer as question is not clear	Missing
depends on a lot of things	Missing
depends on many things, should you turn down money??	Missing
Depends on so many factors	Missing
depends on the country	Missing
don't know	Missing
it depends	Missing
it depends	Missing
It depends on the situation in the country, which country!	Missing
just depends on the situation!	Missing
n/a	Missing
N/A	Missing
Nothing is less in cut-throat competition for resources	Missing
These days, size of grant not important, rather of essence is; would it unlock additional investment	Missing
whatever the specific project requires	Missing
worth is not valued by the amount of money	Missing

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6. Robustness checks

Figure A2: Re-weighting responses (based on region, gender, and grade)






Figure A3: Clustered standard errors



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Figure A4: Clustered & re-weighted



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Figure A5: Country & sector-focused staff—funding amount





Figure A6: Country & sector-focused staff—overheads



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Figure A7: Results by IO—funding amount





Figure A8: Results by IO—Overhead



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Figure A9: distribution of DV—overheads





Figure A10: distribution of DV—funding amounts



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Figure A11: results with Poisson regression





Figure A12: distribution of DV—overheads (logged)



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Figure A13: distribution of DV—funding amounts (logged)






Figure A14: results—logged DVs



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Figure A15: excluding LinkedIn results



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Table A5: Benjamini-Hochberg multiple comparison adjustment (Figures 1, 2 and 3)

Variable	DV	Coefficient	Pvalue	Rank	BH value
Country-earmarked	Refuse funds	-0.0151	0.208	11	0.023
Sector-earmarked	Refuse funds	-0.0021	0.859	20	0.042
Project-earmarked	Refuse funds	0.0047	0.700	17	0.035
Own-area-of-work-earmarked	Refuse funds	-0.0268*	0.038	6	0.013
Length: 3 years	Refuse funds	-0.0411*;+	0.002	3	0.006
Source: Private foundation	Refuse funds	0.0272*	0.009	4	0.008
Country-earmarked	Overheads	-0.1891	0.714	18	0.038
Sector-earmarked	Overheads	0.7697	0.264	13	0.027
Project-earmarked	Overheads	-0.2618	0.628	16	0.033
Own-area-of-work-earmarked	Overheads	-0.0032	0.996	24	0.050
Length: 3 years	Overheads	0.3978	0.426	14	0.029
Source: Private foundation	Overheads	-0.8551	0.206	10	0.021
Country-earmarked	Amount	0.2076	0.908	22	0.046
Sector-earmarked	Amount	1.6231	0.250	12	0.025
Project-earmarked	Amount	-0.1959	0.889	21	0.044
Own-area-of-work-earmarked	Amount	-0.0615	0.968	23	0.048
Length: 3 years	Amount	1.4129	0.110	8	0.017
Source: Private foundation	Amount	2.2159	0.119	9	0.019
Country-earmarked	Forced choice	0.0059	0.750	19	0.040
Sector-earmarked	Forced choice	0.0454*	0.011	5	0.010
Project-earmarked	Forced choice	0.0102	0.573	15	0.031
Own-area-of-work-earmarked	Forced choice	0.0803*;+	0.000	1	0.002
Length: 3 years	Forced choice	0.1811*;+	0.000	2	0.004
Source: Private foundation	Forced choice	-0.0330	0.074	7	0.015

Note: $p < 0.05$, $^{+}p < 0.006$ (BH critical value)



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